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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

concentrated animal feeding operations ("CAFOs")) to acquire
permits under Indiana's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System ("NPDES") program. Save the Valley sought to compel EPA to
assume enforcement of Indiana's NPDES program and to initiate
proceedings to withdraw Indiana's authority to enforce NPDES
permits under section 1319(a) (2) of the CWA. EPA filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure
to state a claim.
The court held the language of the CWA imposed a mandatory
duty upon the EPA Administrator ("Administrator") to issue a
compliance order notifying Indiana that widespread problems in the
enforcement of the State's NPDES program existed. In addition, the
court held the Administrator was required to enforce NPDES permits
until Indiana remedied its NPDES program.
In reaching its holding, the court reviewed the plain language and
legislative history of the CWA to determine whether the CWA imposed
a mandatory duty upon the Administrator to issue a compliance order.
The court held, based on well-established rules of statutory
construction, that the use of the word "shall" in the phrase "the
Administrator shall so notify the State" imposed a mandatory duty
upon the Administrator to notify Indiana of the problems with its
NPDES program. The court also determined the legislative history
imposed a mandatory duty upon the Administrator to act upon
discovering problems with Indiana's NPDES program. The court
rejected EPA's argument that the Administrator was first required to
make a "finding" and "determination" before notification duties were
triggered. The court held EPA's interpretation of the finding and
determination requirements were inconsistent with the congressional
intent of the CWA and would frustrate the CWA's citizen enforcement
provision.
Therefore, the court denied EPA's motion to dismiss and denied
Save the Valley's request for a hearing on mootness.
Julie E. Hultgren
United States v. Alcoa, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 1031 (N.D. Ind. 2000)
(holding a mandate to clean up contaminated sediment as a result of a
permit violation is an appropriate remedy under the Clean Water Act).
Alcoa, Inc. ("Alcoa") discharged a number of regulated substances
into tributaries of the Wabash River while manufacturing aluminum
products. Alcoa received a permit in 1985 pursuant to the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") to discharge
several substances subject to strict limitations. The Government
alleged between 1993 and 1999, Alcoa exceeded its discharge limit
concerning polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs") on sixty-three separate
occasions. The Government filed suit in the Northern District Court
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of Indiana under the Clean Water Act ("CWA") asking for several
remedies that included an injunction requiring Alcoa to develop and
carry out a plan for remediation of the contaminated sediments in the
subject watershed. Alcoa challenged the remedy as unavailable under
the statute. Alcoa subsequently filed a 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss the
Government's claim. The court held that authority to grant an
injunction under the "require compliance" language of the CWA was
broad enough to mandate the clean up of contaminated sediments as
a result of a NPDES permit violation, and denied Alcoa's motion.
The CWA authorizes an agency to "require compliance" when
violations of a NPDES permit have occurred. The Government argued
this language covered remediation actions for contaminated sediments
released in violation of an NPDES permit. The Government showed
the discharges of PCBs violated Alcoa's permit, and that the presence
of PCBs in the sediment created a risk to human health. PCBs are
toxic and do not break down naturally in the environment, but instead
Therefore, the
spread throughout the sediment over time.
Government reasoned the presence of PCBs in the sediment created a
continuing violation of the NPDES permit. The Government asserted
the "require compliance" language was broad enough to cover this
kind of continuing violation where an entity exceeded its NPDES
permit discharge limitations. Although no case law existed to support
the notion, the Government likened this situation to the illegal filling
of wetlands and introduced a number of cases in which courts had
ordered restoration of natural resources as a means of "enforcing
compliance."
Alcoa disagreed, stating the statutory scope of the enforcement
provision limited the Government to fines and an injunction to ensure
Alcoa argued restoration actions in
future permit compliance.
wetlands do not apply to NPDES permits, and contended wetland
remediation was governed by a different section of the CWA statute.
Alcoa distinguished a violation of an NPDES permit from the illegal
filling of a wetland by focusing on the action the permit granted.
Section 404 of the CWA grants a party with a permit the ability to fill a
wetland. To order compliance for a violation of Section 404, the party
would have to remove the improperly deposited fill. On the other
hand, in Section 402, Alcoa argued, the onus of the permit is on the
discharge itself, not the pollutant. Once a discharge is complete, the
enforcement provision of the CWA authorizes fines to be levied and
requires compliance with the permit for future discharges. No specific
language authorizes remediation of contaminated sediments from any
given pollutant once it had been discharged.
The court held the authority to grant an injunction to "require
compliance" is broad enough to include mandated clean up of
contaminated sediments as a result of a NPDES permit violation. The
court rejected Alcoa's argument that Congress intended to create two
different remedial actions concerning NPDES permit violations and
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the illegal filling of wetlands. The court limited the scope of the
remediation action by establishing a number of criteria to be met by
First, the court required the Environmental
the Government.
Protection Agency ("EPA") establish the sediments were contaminated
with a substance that was released by Alcoa in an amount exceeding
the NPDES permit. Second, the court held EPA must show that the
substance is hazardous to human health and the environment, and
that it will not break down over time. Third, EPA must demonstrate
the contaminant will continue to be released into the waters of the
United States at such a level as to contaminate the water and make it
unsafe for designated uses. Finally, the court stated there must be a
rough proportionality between the Alcoa's permit violations and the
relief sought by the Government.
Patrick Nackley
United States v. Metalite Corp., NA 99-008-CR-B/N, 2000 U.S. Dist.
I.EXIS 11507 (S.D. Ind. July 28, 2000) (holding an indictment under
the Clean Water Act was sufficient because the relevant provision
clearly stated the scienter requirement, knowingly, and not a specific
intent, and the defense was not substantially prejudiced by undue
delay).
A federal grand jury indicted defendant Metalite Corporation
("Metalite"), including Marvin Friedman, the owner and president of
Metalite, and Wayne Friedman, the vice-president of Metalite, for
violating the Clean Water Act ("CWA") by knowingly discharging
pollutants into waters of the United States without a permit. Metalite
made aluminum reflector lighting fixtures and generated wastewater
in the aluminum anodizing process. This wastewater contained lead
and other metals, as well as phosphoric, nitric, and sulphuric acids.
The wastewater, along with its pollutants, was discharged through an
underground storm water drain pipe behind the Metalite building and
eventually into the Ohio River. Metalite moved to dismiss this
indictment based on three issues: the CWA's scienter requirement, the
CWA's alleged vagueness, and the Government's alleged undue delay
in returning the indictment.
Under CWA section 1319(c)(2)(A), to knowingly violate CWA
section 1311 is a felony. Section 1311(a) "effectively prohibits
discharging any pollutant from a point source into the navigable
waters of the United States without a permit." Metalite argued the
word "knowingly" in section 1319(c) (2) (A) required the Government
to prove that Metalite acted with specific intent and thus, knew its acts
violated the law. In contrast, the Government argued the court should
apply the Supreme Court's statutory interpretation utilized in a
previous case, where the Court held a "knowing" violation of
regulations applies even where the defendant had no knowledge of

